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IC 75-1475

MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: National Situation Report Test

1. Several of our post-mortems have shown that consumers are interested in receiving a single national situation report during periods of crisis in lieu of the overlapping reports now being prepared by individual agencies.

2. On 9 January 1975, USIB asked the IC Staff to conduct a feasibility study, which we did on 18 March. For the test:

- OCI/DDI acted as chairman;
- CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA participated;
- a six-hour period was used; and
- Indochina and Thailand were the venue.

3. Our test showed that it is possible to produce a national crisis report within the six-hour time frame. However, the test was not a success in terms of manpower savings and improved product. The principal shortcomings were both technical and bureaucratic.

--From a technical point of view, the current means of communicating between agencies is inadequate. Until CONTEXT is fully operational, we will not have the means to edit text between remote locations.

--Bureaucratic problems are potentially more serious. DIA strongly resisted the idea that the DCI's national crisis report should be produced at the CIA Operations Center.

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DIA argued that crises, particularly those with a strong military character, should be directed from the NMIC-- which would provide reports to the DCI--because of its superior communications and its link with those making US operating force decisions. DIA agreed to participate in the test only after it was clearly spelled out that its participation did not constitute agreement that the center for producing a national situation report should be at CIA.

4. I recommend that this project be shelved temporarily. Once CONTEXT is operational we should try again. We should first solve the technical communications problem. Once we prove that we can talk and edit text, we will be in a better position to tackle the bureaucratic problem.

5. I recommend that at the next USIB meeting you make a verbal comment along the following lines:

OK
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"At USIB's direction, the IC Staff has been testing the feasibility of producing a national situation report during periods of crisis. This test has run into a snag-- the principal problem being our present inability to communicate and adjust text at remote locations on a real-time basis. We therefore intend to delay further tests until CONTEXT is operational."

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

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